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We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of
opponents who are small, but not anonymous. If the play of the small players is observed
with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded
independently of the number of small players, then as the number of small players grows,
the equilibrium set converges to that of the game where there is a continuum of small
players.  The paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by
dropping the assumption that small players actions are “anonymous.”  That is, we allow
each small player’s actions to be observed separately, instead of supposing that the small
players’ actions are only observed through their effect on an aggregate statistic.
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1.  Introduction
This paper examines a game played by a single large player and a number of
small opponents.  Our interest is in finding conditions under which the small players are
negligible, in the sense that the actions of any individual small player have little or no
effect on the subsequent play of others.   In contrast to previous work (discussed below)
on this “negligibility” question, we do not wish to impose the condition that the small but
non-infinitesimal players are anonymous.  Instead, we will suppose that each small
player’s action influences the distribution of a distinct signal, which may be thought of as
a noisy signal of that player’s action.  Thus, even when there are many players, the large
player may  be able to make a fairly precise inference about the actions of any small
opponent. Nevertheless, we will argue that the large player will not be able to exploit this
information, and that the outcome of the game is as if the actions of individual small
players could not be observed.
The key assumption we use is that the number of actions the large player has
available is not too large relative to the number of small players. Under this assumption,
the large player is not able to implement separate rewards and punishments for each
individual small player.  As we show, this implies that the small players (to a good
approximation) ignore the effect their actions might have on the large player’s play.
Consequently, in the one-shot case the large player can do no better than to commit to an
uncontingent choice of action (as in a Stackelberg equilibrium) even if commitments to
contingent “threat” strategies are allowed.  In the case of a repeated game, a similar
argument shows that the small players to a good approximation behave myopically, that
is, they ignore the effect of their current actions on the future play of their opponents.
This provides a rationale for using reputation models with myopic opponents in situations
where the opponents are actually long-lived  but small.
To see why the negligibility of small players requires a proof, recall that in general
dynamic games, equilibria can be radically different in a model with a finite number of2
agents than in the standard model used to describe the continuum-of-agents limit.  In the
standard model it is assumed that the play of any measure-0 set (and hence of any single
agent) is ignored.   The problem is that in any finite game each agent has positive
measure, and so in principle each agent’s actions can be observed, but in the continuum
limit this information “vanishes.”
1  Consequently the games with finitely many agents
may have equilibria where the small players are induced to play non-myopically by the
consideration of future rewards or punishments that can be triggered by their current
action, yet such equilibria are ruled out by the “negligibility” assumption of the
continuum model.
Green (1980), Sabourian (1990),  and Levine and Pesendorfer (1995) show that
 the negligibility assumption holds approximately in all equilibria of games with small
but non- infinitesimal agents provided that the agents are anonymous and their aggregate
play is observed with some noise.  More formally, these papers assume that the
distribution of observed signals depends on some aggregate statistic of the small players’
actions, such as the sum, and that this distribution is non-degenerate.
2
In this paper, we drop the anonymity assumption, and suppose that the large
player receives a noisy signal of each small player’s action.  Why does the lack of
anonymity matter?  If the large player knows the small players by name, she may pick on
a particular player or players, and punish and reward them to manipulate their behavior.
                                                
1  The assumption that measure-0 sets cannot be observed is usual in this context, but is not necessary.  See
Fudenberg and Levine (1988) for a model of non-anonymous players and observed actions in which
information is preserved in passing to the continuum of players limit.
2 Note that the anonymity condition on its own is not sufficient for this conclusion, , since, with a finite
number of players, there is a change in the aggregate play whenever any player deviates.  Consequently, a
slight deviation of aggregate play from the equilibrium outcome indicates that someone must have deviated,
and so the large player can design a strategy that deters deviations regardless of the size of the small
players. Yet in the continuum of players limit, a deviation by a single small player will not change the
aggregate statistic, and so there cannot be equilibria that rely on punishments.  Intuitively, we would expect
this discontinuity to vanish if individual play is not perfectly observable,  so that the equilibria in the finite
player case would be similar to that in the continuum limit. Levine and Pesendorfer (1995) show that this is
indeed the case. See also  Dubey and Kaneko (1985) who assume that small deviations are unobservable,
but large deviations are observed perfectly.3
For example, if you know that the government will only build a large public project if you
volunteer to pay for it, your behavior will be quite different than if you are one of many
anonymous voters.  If the large player can reward or punish each  small player
independently, then relaxing the anonymity condition overturns the negligibility result.
The essential point of this paper is that non-anonymous small players do remain
negligible if the large player is limited in her number of actions, so that most small
players must necessarily be treated as if they are anonymous.
To get a rough intuition for this, consider a game where each small player chooses
whether to work or shirk, and the large player only has two possible actions, “reward
everyone ” and “punish everyone.”  The small players prefer working to shirking, but they
would rather work and be rewarded than shirk and be punished.  If the large player
observes the small players’ actions without noise, she can induce them all to work by
threatening to punish everyone if even one player shirks.
Next suppose that each small player’s action is observed with noise, so that with
some small probability e the large player thinks a small player has shirked when that
player really worked.  Suppose first that the large player uses a strategy that is feasible
when the small players are anonymous, so that  the probability of punishment depends
only on the number of observations of the outcome “shirk”, and not on the identities of
the apparent shirkers.  Since there will always be a fraction of size approximately e that
appears to have shirked even if they did not,  it is difficult (and in the limit as  N ®¥
impossible) for any anonymous policy of the large player to induce a distribution of
responses that is different if all small players work than if one small player shirks while
the others work, so the small players cannot be induced to work.
If the small players are not anonymous, and the large player’s strategy space is
large enough to permit separate rewards and punishments for  each small player, the
strategy “punish small player i if it looks as though that player shirked” will  induce every4
player to work, so that the introduction of noise does not imply negligibility if players are
not anonymous and personalized punishments are feasible.
However, if the large player only has two actions available, she is unable to
implement these sorts of personalized punishments, and we show  that the result is as if
the small players were anonymous.  This is true even though the large player has the
option of basing her action solely on the observed outcomes of a subset of the small
players, and doing so will induce those agents to work. However, the number of agents
who can be induced to work in this way is bounded independently of the total number of
small payers, so that the fraction of players who can be induced to work converges to 0.
The more general statement of this conclusion is that as the number of small
players grows to infinity, all but a vanishing fraction of them must play as if they are
negligible.   We use this conclusion to extend some results that have already been
obtained for the anonymous case.
Our results follow from a mathematical lemma that has an independently
interesting interpretation.  Consider a discrete random variable with fixed support, such as
categorical
3 data on per capital GNP or tax rates. The lemma says  that the average effect
that  individuals expect to  have on the random  variable is   small if the number of
individuals is large and the signals of each individual’s action are somewhat noisy. In a
sense this lemma implies that there is a limit on the number of “important” individuals.
In section 2 we set up the basic model,  and define the  concept of a “naïve”
equilibrium in which the small players act as if most of them ignore contingent responses
by the large player.  Section 3 discusses the  mathematical lemma summarized in the
previous paragraph, and establishes the  results about naïve equilibrium that are used in
our characterizations of equilibria.
                                                
3 That is, the data is reported in categories such as $10,000 to $11,999.5
Instead of proceeding directly to that characterization,  section 4 examines the
extent to which the result of section 3 can be obtained in limits where the number of large
player’s actions grows along with the number of small players.  Readers interested
primarily in the application of our results to  the equilibria of games may want to skip this
section, as it is not  used in the remainder of the paper.
Our first application of the theory is in section 5, which considers the case of one-
shot games in which a single large player may choose a precommitment strategy against a
number of small players.
4  The essential point we make is similar to that in Levine and
Pesendorfer (1995):  without noise the large player can appropriate all the surplus, but
with noisy observation of the small players, she can only get the Stackelberg payoff.
The second application applies  the results to dynamic games .  We show  that
when the play of non-myopic small players is observed with noise, to a good
approximation they play “myopically” in the sense of not trying to influence the future
actions of other players.  This result is of particular interest when coupled with the
literature on maintaining a reputation against myopic opponents, as it provides an
alternative interpretation for the assumption of myopic play. Section 6 considers the
finitely repeated case, and section 7 considers the case of infinite repetition with
discounting.
Section 8 contains a concluding discussion of our results.
2.  The “One-Shot” Model
This section develops a “one-shot ” model in which each player acts only once.
There are N  small players iN = 1, , K , and one large player 0.  In the first stage of the
                                                
4While such a structure may seem very special, a recent theoretical literature shows that such a
precommitment equilibrium is a consequence of reputation building in a repeated setting even when
precommitment is impossible. This was implicit in the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and
Roberts (1982), and made explicit in the work of Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992). Schmidt (1993),
Celentani (1991), Celentani and Pesendorfer (1996) and others have extended the scope of this result in a
variety of ways.6
game, the small players simultaneously choose one of a finite number of actions aA ii Î ;
following this the large player chooses an action bB 0 Î .  There are ma actions for each
small player, andmb  for the large player.  We let aa a a N = (,, , ) 12 K  be a profile of
actions for the small  players only, and aaa aa ii i N -- + = ( , ,,, ) 11 1 KK , and so forth.  We
denote mixed actions by a i   As a result of small player i’s action one of finitely many
individual outcomes  yY ii Î  results. The probability of individual outcome yi  is denoted
rii i ya (|) . We also write ra (| ) y  for the joint probability of the vector of  individual
outcomes given the profile of mixed actions.  Somewhat loosely we use a  for both the
profile of mixed actions, and for the joint probability this profile induces over pure action
profiles.
The large player moves after observing the outcomes of the small players, but not
their actions, so that a strategy for the large player is a map s 01 :( ) ´® = i
N
i YB D , where
D() B  is the set of probability distribution over B.  We assume that the utility of each
small players depends only on that player’s actions and the action of the long-run player;
this utility is denoted  uab ii (, ) .  The utility of the large player uaa ab N 012 (,, , , ) K , on the
other hand, depends on the actions of all the small players as well as the large player’s
own action.
This assumption is more restrictive than necessary, as our main results also hold if
each small player’s utility  depends on some aggregates of the play of all small players, so
long as the support of these aggregates is bounded independently of the number of
players.  However, the results do not apply to games where small players interact directly
with one another in subsets of small groups.
Our first set of definitions holds fixed the strategy of the large player.
Definition 1 (best response profiles):  A best response profile to s 0 is a mixed small
player profile a  such that for all small players i, and all  ¢ ai ,
ua b b y y a a uab b y y aa a ii ayb ii ay b ii ii
i (, ) ( | ) ( | )( ) (, ) ( | ) ( |, ) ( )
,, ,, åå ³ ¢¢
- -- - sr a sr a 00 .7
We wish to compare this to the situation where the small players  “naively” ignore
the fact that their actions influence the observed outcomes and hence the play of the large
player.
Definition 2 (naive best response profile ):  A naive best response profile to s 0 is a
mixed small player profile a such that for all small  players i and all  ¢ ai ,
uab b y y a a ua b b y y a a ii ayb ii ayb (, ) ( | ) ( | )( ) (, ) ( | ) ( | )( )
,, ,, åå ³ ¢ sr a sr a 00 .
We will show that under certain circumstances a best response profile  is like a
naive best response profile.  Because we are considering games with finitely many
players, there will always be some loss to naive play; we will show that this loss must be
small when there are many players.  Notice that the definitions here do not impose
anonymity; in particular they allow the large player to choose her action based on the
outcome of just one single small player.  Such a small player will have a strong incentive
not to play naively.  However, it is only possible for the large player to target a small
number of small players this way; more precisely, we will show that the loss from naive
play averaged over the small players is small.  This motivates the following definition.
Definition 3 (e-naive best response profile):  An e-naive best response given s 0 is a
mixed profile a for the small players such that  there are individual losses ei ³ 0  with
ee i i
N
N
= å £
1 ,  and such that for all small players i and all  ¢ ai ,
uab b y y a a ua b b y y a a ii ayb ii i ayb ( ,) (|)(|)() ( ,) (|)(|)()
,, ,, åå +³ ¢ sr a e sr a 00 .
We will also make use of the analogous notion of approximate best response.
Definition 4 (e-best response profile):  An e -best response profile  given s 0 is a mixed
small player profile a for the small players such that there are individual losses ei ³ 0
with  ee i i
N
N
= å £
1  and such that for all small players i and all  ¢ ai ,8
uab b y y a a uab b y y aa a ii ayb ii i ay b ii ii
i (, ) ( | )( | )( ) (, ) ( |)( |, ) ( ) .
,, ,, åå +³ ¢¢
- -- - sr a e sr a 00
3.  Best Response Profiles are Approximately  Naive
  Our goal in this section is to give a theorem showing that Nash equilibria are
approximate naïve equilibria.   This proposition, as well as  the ones that follow, is based
on the following mathematical fact that is an immediate corollary of Lemma A' in the
Appendix.
Lemma A:  Let  yi be N  independent random variables each taking on the values
{,} yy ii
01 , and let  p be another random variable with finite support, which may be
correlated with the  yi .  Then
pr p y y pr p y y
N Np r y y
ii ii i
N
ik i i
k
() ()
min ( ) ,
Î= - Î=
£
=
= å PP
10
1 2
.
Roughly, what this lemma says is that the average effect that an individual can
have on a future variable is bounded by a number that is small if there are many decision
makers and the outcomes of individual decisions is relatively random.  To understand
why this lemma is true, it is useful to think of the y’s as binary (yes, no) “votes”  that
determine  p Î- {, } 11 .  Further, suppose that the minimum probability that any individual
assigns to any vote is bounded away from zero, so that the bound in the lemma has some
force.
5
One simple case is majority rule:  if more than half the votes are yes then p = 1. If
there are  many voters no individual is likely to be decisive,  and so the lemma is not
                                                
5 In our model, the “votes” are the outcomes, which are noisy signals of the players’ true actions, but the
lemma holds for more general sources of noise, including “trembles” by the players (so that their true
actions are not their intended ones) and more simply the use of non-degenerate mixed strategies by each
player.  All that is required is that no small player be able to predict the realized value of the signals that
determine the aggregate outcome.9
surprising.  On the other hand, take the case where the rule is that  p = 1 if there is an
even number of yes’s and  p =- 1  if there is an odd number of yes votes.  Ex post, that is,
conditional on the realized values of all votes, every player is decisive: each individual
decision completely determines the outcome.  How can our Lemma possibly hold in this
setting?  The answer is that the lemma is about ex ante decisiveness, i.e.,  the
predictability of outcomes.  If decision makers do not know one another’s decisions in
advance, but have a common prior that every other individual has probability  ½  chance
of voting yes, independent of the others, then no individual has any effect on the
probability that  p = 1 whenever there are two or more players, and  so each individual
has negligible influence even away from the many-player limit.  However if the
probability  of each player voting yes is ¾  then when there are only two players  the
chance that p = 1 is greater  if an individual player votes yes than if the same individual
votes no, and for any finite number of players we would expect that each individual’s
decision has some influence.  However, Lemma A shows that the size of this influence
converges to zero as the number of players gets large .
To make use of Lemma A, we must calculate the loss from naïve behavior.  This
is given in the next lemma, proven in the Appendix. In the following we denote by B a
partition of the large player’s action set and by B ÎB a subset of the large player’s
actions contained in the partition.
 Lemma B: Let (B B 1N ,..., )be a collection of partitions of the large player’s action set.
If a is an e -best response profile, it is an ee + ¢ -naive best response profile with
¢ £Î - Î ¢
+-
Î¢ =
ÎÎ Î =
å å
å
ea a 2
1
4
1
1
1
max | ( , )| max ( | , ) ( | , )
max max ( , ) min ( , )
,, ,
,
ia b i i B y y i i i
N
aB bB i i bB i i i
N
ii i
i
uab
N
pr b B y pr b B y
N
uab uab
B
B
i
i
This bounds the naïve loss by two terms.  The first is an average of conditional
probabilities which is bounded by Lemma A.  The second measures the utility variation10
of small players  as the large player’s action varies within a member of the partition.
Thus the bound has force only if the partitions are constructed in such a way that for most
players the utility variation within each member of the partition is small.
The easiest application of Lemma’s A and B is when all the elements of the
partitions Bi  in Lemma B are sets consisting of a single action.  In this case the final term
in Lemma B drops out, as there is no utility variation at all within partitions.  The bound
from Lemma B is then
¢ £- ¢ ¢ å å ea a 2
1
max | ( , )| max ( | , ) ( | , ) ,, , ia b i i y y i i b i ii i uab
N
pr b y pr b y .
Recall that ra iii y (| )  is the probability of outcome yi under the mixed action ai, so that
ra iii y (| ) = ra ii i ii a ya a
i (|) () å .
We can apply Lemma A to conclude:
Proposition 1:  If a is an e -best response profile, it is an ee + ¢ -naive best response
profile with    ¢ = 
!  
"
$##
e
ra
1 4
N
mu a b
y
bi a b i i
iy i i i
i
i
max | ( , )|
min ( | )
,,
,
.
  The key fact to note is that the  ¢ e of this proposition shrinks to 0 as  N ®¥, provided
that the ri have uniformly full support, that payoffs are uniformly bounded, and that the
number of large player’s actions,  mb,  remains fixed.
If mb  increases rapidly with the number of small players, then  ¢ e  in Proposition 1
need not go to zero as the number of players goes to infinity.  However, some cases in
which m
b  is large either for all N  or in the limit can be accommodated by choosing a
coarser  partition than the singleton sets used in Proposition 1.
As an example, consider the case in which the large player’s action space is a
compact subset of a finite- dimensional Euclidean space, and the small players’ utility
functions are uniformly continuous in the action of the large player.  In this case the set of
utility profiles for the small players that can be achieved by varying the large player’s11
actions can be well approximated by a finite set.  Specifically, for every  ¢¢ e  we may find
a partition B of the large players action set into mB() ¢¢ e  components so that for every
player i
max ( , ) min ( , ) ’’ b B ii b B ii uab uab ÎÎ ¢ - ¢ £ e
Note that, as in Proposition 1, the partition is independent of the player.  The
following proposition follows now immediately from  Lemmas A and B
Proposition 1’:  If  a is an e -best response profile, it is an ee + ¢ -naive best response
profile with  ¢ =
¢¢ 
!  
"
$##
+ ¢¢ e
e
ra
e
1 4
4
N
mu a b
y
Bi a b i i
iy i i i
i
i
() m a x | ( , ) |
min ( | )
,,
,
.
4. Games with Individualized Punishment
If the large player can punish each individual small player without affecting the
payoff of other small players, it is clear that a best response need not be even
approximately naive, as each small player can correctly anticipate a personal punishment
for deviating from the equilibrium profile.  This raises the question of precisely how well
targeted punishments must be before best responses are no longer approximately naïve.
Readers interested primarily in the application of our results to  the equilibria of games
may want to skip this section, as it is not  used in the remainder of the paper.
 As an illustration and partial answer to this question, in this section, we focus
attention on games with the following simple structure. The large player’s action is the
choice of a subset of small players (including the null set). The interpretation is that the
chosen subset is the set of small players that will be punished. Small player utility
depends only on the action of the large player.  Specifically, let Y  denote a class of
subsets of small players with generic element  y .  For every y ÎY there is a
corresponding large player action by ; each small player’s utility can take on one of two
values, 1 if the small player is not in y  or 0 if she is in y .12
Each class of subsets gives rise to a particular game.  In some of these games best
responses will be approximately naïve, and in some they will not.  The question we wish
to pose is for which classes of subsets Y  (or more precisely the corresponding games)
best responses will be approximately naïve.  As we already noted, if  Y  consists of all 2
N
subsets of small players, best responses will typically not be approximately naïve.
However, best responses need not be approximately naïve even if the number of subsets
of small players that can be punished is  not nearly this large.  Consider a partition of the
set of small players so that each element of the partition except one has k players. The
class Y  consists of unions of the elements of this partition. If Y  is equal to all the sets
that may be obtained through unions of elements of the partition then there are roughly
()
/ 2
1 kN  sets inY .  If k  is fixed then the best response profiles may fail to be
approximately naïve for all N.
6  This implies that if the number of actions increases with
the number of small players at any exponential rate, then best response profiles need not
be naïve in the limit.
To find a positive result  we restrict the size of the sets in the classY .  Let k() Y
denote the largest number of players in any member of Y ; that is the greatest number of
players that can be punished simultaneously.
Proposition 1’’:  If  a is an e -best response profile, it is an ee + ¢ -naive best response
profile with e
ra
k
ra
’m a x | ( , ) |
min ( | )
()
min ( | )
,
, ,
£+ 
!    
"
$ # #
4
2
ab i i
iy i i i iy i i i
i
i i
uab
Ny Ny
Y
.
Proof: see Appendix.
                                                
6 To see this note that if the large player punishes every small player who appears to deviate from his
prescribed action then the small players action has a non-negligible influence on his probability of being
punished for all N as long as the fraction of the population punished in equilibrium is not close to one. Thus
if ky a ii i × r (|)  is sufficiently small then the small players action will not be approximately naive even in
the limit.13
Remark:  An analogous result could be obtained in the case where the large player can
either leave all small players unpunished or must punish all but a small fraction of small
players. Thus if N -k() Y  denotes the minimum number of small players that must be
punished then Proposition 1’’  continues to hold.
7
5.  Contingent and Uncontingent Commitments
To illustrate the importance of the small players playing naively, we consider the
best payoff the large player can obtain if she is able to publicly commit himself to a
strategy  s0  before the small players act.
8
If the large player is able to observe the actions of the small players, she can use
this commitment power to induce the small players to choose any action profile that gives
every small player a payoff that is strictly larger than his minmax payoff: If any small
player deviates from the desired action the large player simply minmaxes that small
player. Thus the large player can essentially get the largest payoff consistent with
individual rationality of all small players.
However, we will show that when actions are observed with noise and there are
many small players, the best payoff the large player can obtain from this commitment to a
contingent strategy is the payoff from an uncontingent commitment to a fixed action.
Thus in the limit the large player cannot do better than her Stackelberg payoff of the stage
game, even though the ability to make contingent commitments leads to higher payoffs in
many other settings.
Formally, we consider a sequence of games indexed by N, the number of small
players.  As we increase the number of small players, we hold fixed the players’ action
sets, the utility functions uab ii (,) , and the distribution over individual outcomes
riii ya (,) .  So that we may apply Proposition 1, we assume
                                                
7 The modification of the proof given in the appendix for this case is straightforward.
8 Remember that a strategy here is a contingent plan.14
sup | ( , )| , inf ( | ) ,, , ia b i i iy i i i ii uab y <¥ > ra0.
Games are defined by a sequence of utility functions ua a ab
N
N 01 2 (,, , ,) K for the
large player.  We assume that these utility functions are uniformly bounded.
The Stackelberg payoff for the large  player,  denoted u
NS
0 , is the highest payoff
the large player can get from publicly committing to a fixed, possibly mixed,  action.
Formally, this payoff is given by
u
NS
0 =m a x[( , ) | (, )m a x (’ , ) ] ,’ ab a ab a b a b uu u i
N
ii ii i 0 =  for all  .
In general, the utility of the large player might depend only on the play of one
small player, in which case the fact that there are many small players is irrelevant.  The
interesting case is one in which no small player can have too much impact on the large
player’s utility.  Formally, define the influence of a small player i on the large player’s
utility by
ni
N
aba
NN
ii i ua b ua ab º- ¢ ¢ - m a x (,) (, ,) ,, 0 0 .
This represents the greatest impact of a change in player i’s action on the large player’s
utility for any combination of play by other players.
Definition 5:  Small players are asymptotically negligible if the combined influence of all
players remains bounded, i.e.,  n i
N
i
N K
= å £
1  for some K <¥, and if the individual
influences go to zero uniformly, i.e., maxiN i
N
£ ® n 0 .
Our main result in this section is that when small players are asymptotically
negligible and the large player observes only the small players’ outcomes, she can do no
better in the limit than the Stackelberg payoff. This is analogous to a similar result in
Levine and Pesendorfer (1995), who restrict the large player to play strategies that depend
only on the average play of the small players.
Proposition 2:  Let s0
N  be a sequence of strategies for the large player, and suppose that
ai
N  are a best response profile to s0
N .  If small players are asymptotically negligible  then15
 l i m s u p (,) (|)(| ) ()
,, N
NN N
aby
NN S ua b b y y a a u ®¥å -= 00 0 0 sra .
Before proving Proposition 2, we examine several examples that illustrate what it
means for the small players to be asymptotically negligible.  In all of these examples, the
small players’ actions are either 0 or 1, and the large player’s utility does not depend on
her own action.  Note that this does not trivialize Proposition 2, since the large player
action still indirectly has an impact on her own utility through the effect it has on small
players’ incentives.
In the first set of examples we study, the large player’s  utility is a weighted
average of the small players’ actions.  That is,
ua a ab w a
N
Ni
N
i i
N
01 2 1 (,, , , ) K =
= å ,
where  wi
N
i
N =
= å 1
1 .  Notice that in this case the influences  are the same as the weights,
i.e., ni
N
i
N w = .  Consequently, the condition for asymptotic negligence reduces to the
condition that the weights converge uniformly to zero.  That is, maxiN i
N w £ ® 0 .  The
most obvious examples are wN i
N = 1/ , in which case asymptotic negligibility is
obviously satisfied, and wwi
N
i
N
110 1 == > ,,  in which case it is obviously not.  There are
also some less obvious examples, such as wi N i
N = 12 /  and wi N i
N = 1/ log .   It can
easily be seen from integrating  (/ ) 1
1 tt
t
d I  and  (/) 1
1 tt d
t I  that  wi
N
i
N »
= å 1
1  in both
cases.  In both cases it is also obvious that maxiN i
NN ww £ =® 1 0 .  This implies that
asymptotic negligibility is satisfied.  Notice, however that the ratio between the influence
of the first and Nth players goes to infinity, so that asymptotic negligibility does not imply
anything about the relative significance of players.
Finally, it is useful to consider a case which can not be reduced to a simple
average, and in which the location of the players plays a key role.  Let us consider the
case where the large player’s utility is the (equally weighted) average of the number of
small players i who chose 1 and whose predecessor i -1 did not choose 0.  (In effect,
choosing 0 not only gives nothing to the large player, but nullifies the choice of the next16
player in line). In this case, if, for example, half the population is playing 1 and half 0,
location is crucial.  If players playing 1 are highly clustered, the large player gets around
½; if the players playing 0 are every other player, or nearly so, then the large player gets
almost nothing.  Notice, however, that the asymptotic negligibility condition is satisfied
in this example.
To prove Proposition 2, we need a technical Lemma.
Lemma C:  If small players are asymptotically negligible then for all e > 0 there exists
N  such that for all NN ³ and all profiles a
N  there exists a pure profile a
N  such that
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Proof:  Replace ( ,..., ) aa 1 N  by ( ,..., ) aa N 1  by taking a random draw according to the
probability distribution ( ,..., ) aa 1 N . We show that the random variables
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converge in probability to zero, from which it follows that most choices of a (most
meaning with respect to the probability distribution a ) have the desired property.  To
show that the random variables converge to zero in probability, we compute
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However, the assumption of asymptotic negligibility implies that maxiN i
N v £ ® 0  and
limNi
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1 , so we have convergence in quadratic mean, implying convergence
in probability. q
Proof of Proposition 2:  Let K
N  be a sequence of integers that satisfies
(a) K
N ®¥ and17
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Clearly, by the assumption of asymptotic negligibility such a sequence of number exists.
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Ï å .  We may apply Proposition 1 to the game consisting just
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This in turn implies that there is a best response  $ ai
N  to the mixed action
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We may now calculate for the large player using the definition of b0
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Next by Lemma B it follows that for some pure profile a
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Therefore we can apply Lemma C twice to conclude18
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allowing N ®¥ now yields the desired result. 
6. Finitely Repeated Games
Reputation effects are often analyzed in models with a single patient player who
faces many myopic opponents.  One justification for the myopia assumption is that the
myopic players are really small players who play “as if” they were myopic because they
are too small to have a significant effect on other players’ future play.  In the next two
sections we give a precise interpretation of this.
We begin by considering the undiscounted, finitely repeated case; in the next
section we examine an infinite horizon model in which the small players discount future
payoffs.  We first describe the stage game played in every period.  In the stage game, each
small player and the large player simultaneously take an action.  (Note that this
differentiates the model from that of previous sections, where the large player moves after
the small ones.) Actions of the small players continue to be denoted by aA ii Î ;  actions
of the large player are denoted byxX Î. Let mX  denote the number of actions of the
large player.  Periods are denoted by tT =< ¥ 1,..., .  As before, as the result of a small
player’s action one of finitely many individual outcomes yY i Î  occurs. (Note that at each
date t the distribution of that period’s  outcome  yi
t  given player i’s action ai
t  is
distributed independently  of all past outcomes and of the contemporaneous outcomes of
other players.)   The probability of each individual outcome is again rii i ya (|) . All
players, when taking an action in period t,  have observed  the profile  yy y N = ( ,..., ) 1  and19
the play of the large player in all previous periods. For a sequence of actions of a small
player and the large player and outcomes ( , , ) ayx i
t
i
tt  the payoff of the small player is
given by:
uax i
t
i
tt
t
T (,)
= å 0 .
The payoffs of the large player are not relevant as the strategy of the large player is held
fixed.
We denote by hi
t  the private history of small player i and by h
t  the public history
up to but not including period t.  Pure strategies are maps from private and public
histories to actions.  Let ( ,..., , ) tt s 10 N  denote a mixed strategy profile for the small
players and the large player respectively.  The assumption that the small players play
myopically is captured in the next definition.
Definition 6:  The small players’ profile ( ,..., ) tt 1 N  is an e  myopic best response profile
to  s 0  if for each player i there is an ei ³ 0 such that for every history  h
t  that has
positive probability  ua x hh a h x ua x h x i
t
i ax i
tt
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i x
t
i (, )(,) [] () [ ] (, ) () [ ]
, åå +³ ¢ ts e s 00 , for
all  ¢Î aA ii  and  ee i
i
N / £ å .
Our goal is to show that approximate best-responses are approximately myopic.
Proposition 3:  If (, , ) tt 1 K N  is an e -best response profile to s0  then ( ,..., ) tt 1 N  is an
ee + ¢  myopic best response profile to s 0  where
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Remark:  The crucial point is that  ¢ ® e 0 as  N ®¥, provided that the ri  have
uniformly full support, and that payoffs are uniformly bounded.
Proof:  We denote by  ¢ e () t  the maximum average utility loss of small players from
playing a myopic best response in periods tt T , ,..., +1 .20
We compute  ¢ e () t  recursively from the end of the game and then set ee ’m a x ’ ( ) = t t. In
period T it is obvious that  ¢ = e () T 0 .  Now we suppose we are given  ¢ + e () t 1  in a
subgame that is reached with positive probability starting in period  t+1.   
In period t every small player i chooses action ai. Conditional on ai being
realized equilibrium strategies induce a probability distribution over actions of the large
player in each period and over public outcomes. Let bx x
tt T =
+ ( ,..., )
1  be the actions for
the large player from period t+1 on and let Vb i
Tt t -- 1 ( ) be the payoff of the small player i if
she chooses a myopic best response in every period and if the large player playsb
t.  By
inductive hypothesis,  the actual payoff of the small player in the continuation game
starting in period t+1 is in the interval [ ( ), ( ) ( )] Vb Vb t i
Tt t
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Since ( ,..., ) tt 1 N  is an e-best response profile in the repeated game, it follows that
((,) , . . . , (,) ) tt 1
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t hh hh  is an ee + ¢+ () t 1  best response profile to Ui . Proposition 1 then
implies that ( ( , ),..., ( , )) tt 1
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i  then gives the result.
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7. Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
We now specialize the model of the previous section to discounted payoffs, but
consider the case in which the horizon is infinite.  We assume that T =¥ and that
uax uax i
t
i
t
ii (,) ( ) (,) =- 1 dd ,
  Proposition 4:  Consider a sequence of games with mX  fixed and max ( , ) ,, , iN ax t i
t
i i uax £
bounded. If ( ,..., ) tt 1 N  is a best response to s 0  then ( ,..., ) tt 1 N  is an e
N -myopic best
esponse to s 0   where e
N ® 0 as  Ny a ai N i i i min ( | ) , £ ®¥ r .21
Proof:   Since ( ,..., ) tt 1 N  is a best response to s0   for every history ( , ,..., ) hh h
tt
N
t
1  that
is reached with strictly positive probability ( ,..., ) tt 1 N  is an  ¢ e -best response to s0 in
the T -period game beginning with that history, where
¢ = ed
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We now apply Proposition 3 to find that ( ,..., ) tt 1 N  is an e  myopic best response where
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giving the desired result.
r
8. Conclusions
There are several extensions and implications of our results that should be
remarked on.  First, Propositions 3 and 4 give conditions under which myopic play is
approximately optimal for fixed beliefs about the large player’s strategy.  All that matters
for these results is the expected distribution of the large player’s actions contingent on
various observations, so the propositions apply to models where the large players has
several possible “types” as in the reputation effects literature.  If we consider such a
reputation effects model, and let the number of small players grow as in propositions 3
and 4, then a limiting argument analogous to that of proposition 2 would  show that the
limiting value of the worst Nash equilibrium payoff for the large player equals the lower
bound on this payoff in the “limit model” where the small players are exactly myopic.
Consequently, the payoff bounds obtained in Fudenberg and Levine (1989,1992) for
exactly myopic opponents are also the limiting value of the payoffs when facing many22
small opponents whose actions are observed with noise.  Thus,  as in the one-shot case,
our model provides a justification for results derived under the assumption that small
players act as if they are negligible.
Second, our basic assumption is that the information of the large player about the
small players consists of a separate signal  for each small player, but that the number of
available actions is limited.  It is also of interest to consider the opposite case in which the
large player has many actions, but he has less  information about the small players; an
extreme case of this is that the large player ’s information is simply an  an aggregate of
what the small players do. Levine and Pesendorfer (1995) considered this model with the
additional assumption that the large player cannot target individual small players for
punishments, and showed that the small players behave myopically.  Since the availability
of actions that punish particular players is irrelevant if only an aggregate is observed, the
myopic behavior of the small players extends to this case.  Thus there is a sense in which
this paper and Levine and Pesendorfer (1995) have analyzed opposing endpoints along a
spectrum of sufficient conditions for the negligibility of small players.  The more refined
question of tracing the  frontier of such sufficient conditions is interesting but beyond the
scope of this paper. 
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Appendix A
Lemma A’:  Let  yi be N  independent random variables each taking on the values
{,} yy ii
01 , and let  p be another random variable with finite support, which may be
correlated with the  yi .  Suppose there is ane > 0 such that for each vector
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Lemma B:  Let (B B 1N ,..., )  be N partitions of the large player’s action set.  If a is an
e -best response profile, it is an ee + ¢ -naive best response profile with
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Proof:  Fix an e-best response  profile a .  Let  ¢ ai  be a best response for player i to a
under the “naive” assumption that deviations won’t change the play of the large player.
Then player i’s loss at a  under naive expectations is25
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In words, the loss under naive expectations is bounded by the sum of the loss under
correct expectations and the approximation error.  Note also that
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Finally, we average over i to find the desired conclusion.26
Proposition 1’’:  If  a is an e -best response profile, it is an ee + ¢ -naive best response
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Proof: We construct for each player i a partition consisting of 2 sets: Bii i BB = { ~ , $ }  where
bB i y Î $  if player i gets punished, i.e., if i Îy , and bB i y Î ~  otherwise.
First we demonstrate that if a is an e -best response profile, it is an ee + ¢ -naive best
response profile with
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To demonstrate this, note that the utility variation within the elements of  ~ Bi  and
$ Bi  is zero for every small player.  Therefore, we may apply Lemma B to conclude
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Also note that1-Î=Î pr b B y pr b B y ii ( ~ |) ( $ |)  and therefore 
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This establishes the claim above.
To see the proposition follows from the claim, observe that since the expected
number of players punished must be bounded by the maximum number of players who
can be punished it follows that for all  y27
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Thus setting qy () = 0 we can apply Lemma A’ to our previous claim to conclude that
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